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Abstract
The parliamentary deadlock surrounding the 2007 Belgian election, fake news reports of
dissolution and Time magazine’s discussion of a Czechoslovak style divorce, showcase
how Belgium may be inching towards breakup. We argue that the case of Belgium will be
more likely to follow that of dissolution, the consensual breakup of the center; rather than
go through a divisive secession, the removal of a territory on the periphery. This
differentiates the Belgian case from other contemporary peaceful separatist movements like
Quebec, Catalonia and others which may make it more susceptible to breakup. Moreover,
we argue that based on Hancock (1998), sufficient political and economic changes could
exacerbate tensions such that dissolution becomes increasingly inevitable in the future. We
show how the case of Belgium will likely be similar to that of Czechoslovakia in 1993 as
well as providing lessons from the breakups of personal unions such as Norway-Sweden in
1905 and Serbia-Montenegro in 2006. In sum, we argue that Belgium will not easily
dissolve and that while dissolution is quite possible, it is not yet probable. This study,
therefore, presents some interesting theoretical lessons for dissolution, how it occurs and
how mature democracies face very real challenges with state breakup.
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Introduction
Belgium was, in some senses, Europe’s battleground for close to two millennia as it
effectively demarcated the division between Europe’s Latin and Germanic languages (Reid
2004, 253). Today it is a peaceful state that serves as the capital of a new and emerging
Europe keen on returning to a multipolar world at least in economic terms. Nonetheless,
conflict albeit political and cultural, is persistent in Belgium with the Flemish Dutch
speakers in the north making more and greater calls for increased autonomy and perhaps
outright independence from their Walloon French speaking countrypersons in the south.
Top this all off with a minority German speakers in the east of the country as well as a
capital city that is in the Flemish north of the country, but is dominated by francophone’s
and you have an incredulous mix of peoples and opportunities for political conflict.
It should come as no surprise then that current events on Belgian parliamentary
problems are difficult to stay up-to-date with as new twists and turns occur almost every
week. There have been three Prime Ministers in the last year alone coupled with a
significant period where no leader was available after former Prime Minister Yves Leterme
originally had difficulty forming a government. Seemingly, the divisive issue between the
Flemish north and Walloon south has created significant conflicts over governance and the
future of the country. This has gotten to the point whereby Belgian scholars are now
questioning whether Belgium still exists (Billiet, Maddens and Frognier 2006), whether
Belgium is sustainable (Swenden and Jans 2006) and whether political identity based on
language is so bad that the state may breakup (O’Neill 2000).
Furthermore, there are obvious structural changes that have happened since 1970
which preclude the idea that the breakup of Belgium may not be that far away. The goal of
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this paper then is to assess the current problems in Belgium and to compare them to other
cases of state breakup, most notably the ‘Velvet Divorce’ of Czechoslovakia. We also
follow Hancock’s (1998) argument regarding economic access, political participation and
cultural identity as major factors to showcase why Belgium is or is not in danger of
breakup. Finally, we describe the process through which Belgium could breakup in the near
future. There are plenty of theoretical implications stemming from this case that are linked
to the process of dissolution and many if/then scenarios that could dramatically change the
Belgian state.

Some Current Tensions
As noted at the outset, there are numerous tensions in Belgium. By way of compelling
introduction, we note the case of Katholieke Universiteit in Leuven before moving on to
contemporary cases like RTBF’s fake news report of the breakup of Belgium and the
parliamentary deadlock that occurred for over six months in 2007 and 2008. This was not
the first case of prolonged parliamentary deadlock (1987/88) but if the problem persists, the
continued unity of Belgium may be in grave danger.

University of Leuven Conflict
Perhaps the most compelling example of the divisions in Belgian society is evidenced in
the conflict over the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven, just over the border in the Flemish
north of the country. Founded in 1415, Katholieke Universiteit in Leuven is a prestigious
university set an hour east of Brussels. It is a typical, almost American style university
lodged in a quaint town. It is here, in some ways, that the genesis of modern problems
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broke out. Just prior to the constitutional reforms of 1970, this case served as the backdrop
for the growing divisions in the country and perhaps evidence more so that anything else,
the linguistic divisions in Belgium.
Unhappy with the expansion plans for francophone instruction at the university
(McRae 1983, 115), riots broke out in 1968 over the issue and Flemish students demanded
a linguistic division of the university (Stallaerts 2007, xix). The issue was so large that the
Flemish Christian Social party withdrew its support from the coalition government thus
bringing down parliament on February 7, 1968 (McRae 1983, 115) and, in some senses,
paved the way for increased federalism based on linguistic regions.
The Belgians famously compromised by constructing another university for
francophone students in the Wallonian south of the country in the 1970s after linguistic
differences became too great (Hooghe 2004, 79). This new university was opened in
Louvain-la-Neuve about 15 miles south of Leuven just across the linguistic border in the
Walloon half of the country (McRae 1983, 115). What was perhaps most interesting in this
case is what happened to the numerous library collections: odd numbers were given to one
university and even numbers were given to the other; the divisions were made sensibly, of
course, so as to keep collections of books together.

Fake News of a Breakup
The current debate over the future of Belgium has some pragmatic lessons available from
the cases of Norway-Sweden and Czechoslovakia. Echoing the Czechoslovakian ‘Velvet
Divorce,’ writers are questioning whether the Belgian union could be similarly divided
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between the Flemish and Walloon regions.1 Given the current strength of Flemish parties in
the Belgian parliament, this has increased speculation into the future of the country. A
deadlocked parliament is the cause of this but a recent hoax may now serve as a
premonition for future events.
On 16 December 2006, a fake news report aired on the francophone television
station, RTBF, announcing that the Flemish half of the country had declared
“independence.”2 This news report broadcasted the “secession” of the Flemish region on
television with images of Flemish crowds celebrating and waving black and yellow flags.
Many Belgians, especially in the south, openly wept at this sight and the television station
even had to confess that it was a fake story before the two hour broadcast was over. This
fake news story was meant to provoke a discussion on the future of Belgium and presents
the possibility of dissolution as a very real outcome for the state. The divide between the
Flemish and Walloons is getting more and more attention around the world and the
possibilities for dissolution indeed seem greater in the current climate.3

2007-2008 Parliamentary Deadlock
In recent years, the Belgian state has garnered more attention because of the rise of Flemish
nationalists. The first piece of notable attention came in November 2004 when the far-right
Vlaams Blok was outlawed as part of a constitutional compromise mechanism between the
two major linguistic groups.4 This party has since re-emerged in recent years as the Vlaams
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See Time, ‘A Belgian Divorce?’ (5 Dec. 2007)
See BBC News, ‘Viewers fooled by ‘Belgian split,’’ (14 Dec. 2006)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6178671.stm [accessed 14 Dec. 2007].
3
Ibid.
4
See BBC News, ‘Court rules Vlaams Blok is racist,’ (9 Nov. 2004)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3994867.stm [accessed 14 Dec. 2007].
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Belang and its current leader, Filip Dewinter, argues that the dissolution of Belgium is only
a matter of time and that the country is essentially “two different nations now.”5
Furthermore, the June 2007 general election of a moderate Flemish nationalist,
Yves Leterme, and his subsequent failure to form a government (mainly because of
Walloon mistrust) has threatened to dissolve Belgium in the very near future. Moreover,
Leterme resigned his post as Prime Minister and the Belgian king has now been forced to
help negotiations for the creation of a new government.6 While a new government was
eventually formed when Leterme returned, this crisis may serve as a precursor to future
problems especially over the issue of powers for the regions. Once again, however, the
situation changed when Leterme resigned over the Fortis bank issue. A more moderate
leader, Herman Van Rompuy, has now emerged but his expertise in compromise will
surely be tested. If he fails, further parliamentary deadlock could ensue causing further
threats to the future of Belgium.
The 2007/08 deadlock was not the first time that Belgian parliament was
deadlocked for a significant period of time. In 1987/88, for example, Jean-Luc Dehaene
was charged with forming a coalition government. This might seem normal under most
circumstances except for the fact that Dehaene was the third mediator charged with
bridging the parliamentary crisis and it took him 105 days which was largely unexpected as
the task was considered “mission impossible” (Hooghe 1991, 1).
As in the cases of Norway-Sweden and Czechoslovakia, elites such as Yves
Leterme and Filip Dewinter are, in some regards, hoping to provoke a real constitutional
crisis that will render the country open to dissolution. Because of Leterme’s inability to
5

See New York Times, ‘Calls for a break-up grow ever louder,’ (21 Sept. 2007)
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/world/europe/21belgium.html [accessed 21 Sept. 2007].
6
Stephen Castle, ‘Belgian King enters Dispute,’ New York Times, A4, 4 Dec. 2007.
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form a government for over six months, Belgium was been operating with a very weak
former government that has little authority or ability to govern. The Flemish ethnie has
mobilized such that a real continued constitutional crisis could lead to the break-up of the
country. It may not be the best solution but the previous attempts to share power are
seemingly proving to be very difficult at the present.
Overall, the 2007/08 deadlock did not lead to the dissolution of the state. It is
possible then that a resolution may be found and Belgium will continue to exist as normal.
Flemish nationalism, however, will likely continue and the Belgian state will remain at risk
in the interim. Therefore, some investigation of Flemish nationalism can aid in the
discussion of the possible dissolution of Belgium.

A Brief History of Belgium
This section seeks to introduce some of the historical grievances between Flemings and
Walloons throughout their history together. Obviously, this section could be several books
in and of itself, but it is at least important to highlight some of the differences between the
groups and some significant dates that are still important to people in each community.
One of the earliest descriptions of Belgium comes from the time of Julius Caesar
when he subjugated the Gallic tribes, one of which is the Belgae. Most notably, Caesar
notes that “Of all the tribes, the Belgae are the bravest” (Staellaerts 2007, xxvii). From
here, as was the case with much of Europe, the territory was conquered by various different
armies but the territory remained a juxtaposition between French and Dutch speakers.
Flemish nationalism, historically, has been aroused through subjugation and
domination by the French. In 1226, for example, the Treaty of Melun effectively imposed
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French domination over the Flemish Counts and all people within the territory were forced
to adopt French customs and culture (Snyder 1982, 86). This, however, would not last for
long as political expansion from the Burgundian period beginning in 1382 brought a unity
between northern and southern Dutch speakers. However, in the 1580s, the Spanish
attempted to reassert themselves and successfully re-obtained the southern provinces thus
initiating the religious gulf between Protestant Netherlands and Catholic Flanders (and
Belgium) (McRae 1983, 14).
Throughout the following centuries the Belgian provinces changed jurisdictions
numerous times with the House of Hapsburg taking control in 1500 but the Flemish again
ended up under French control when the provinces were annexed to France in 1794
(Snyder 1982, 86). Belgians vociferously resisted French rule especially under Napoleon
and his downfall effectively contributed to Belgian national unity in its new state (Snyder
1982, 87).
The 1815 Congress of Vienna amalgamated Belgium and Holland into the
Kingdom of the Netherlands (Snyder 1992, 67). This served to effectively detach the
Belgian provinces from France and created a larger Netherlands (McRae 1983, 20). King
William I, despite his progressive behaviors, was stubborn in temperament and initiated a
Dutch only language policy in 1819 which obviously frustrated his francophone subjects
(McRae 1983, 20). Furthermore, William I also frustrated the governmental and
professional elites in the Flemish provinces such that by 1829, the United Kingdom of the
Netherlands was under significant separatist pressure from a re-emergent Belgian territory
(McRae 1983, 20). This chain of events ultimately led to the Revolution in 1830 which
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effectively severed Belgium from the Netherlands and gave the former outright
independence for the first time in its history (McRae 1983, 21).
By 1830, Belgium gained its independence from the Netherlands (Rooney 1982).
Belgium, by virtue of its territorial divisions, found itself in a multiethnic state with both
Flemish and Walloon peoples. The Flemish remembered their historical subjugation at the
hands of French speaking people and their grievances remained paramount in an
independent Belgium. Flemish nationalists made sure to entrench some cultural and
linguistic protections for their people and this proved to be a foundation of the Belgian
state (Clough 1930, 44-46). This grievance centered largely on the issue of identity based
differences.

Argument
There are two significant points of analysis in examining the potential breakup of Belgium:
why and how. The why question might seem somewhat obvious when examining some of
the current tensions and the historical divisions in the country, but it requires more than
simple estimation or conjecture. This is where our introduction of a theoretical approach
could prove useful. Utilizing Hancock’s (1998) argument examining perception of
institutional underdevelopment, we are able to make predictions for the future of Belgium.
The how question is answered by a) delineating dissolution as a mechanism of obtaining
independence from secession and b) explaining the process of dissolution. Process is
important in dissolution and this discussion will be mentioned in two parts. First, it will be
mentioned in this section so as to introduce the basic concepts. Second, it will be described
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in detail in the latter part of this paper when the process can be directly compared to other
cases of state dissolution.
There are three main variables in Hancock’s (1998) relative deprivation argument
including: political participation, economic access and cultural identity. Variations in the
first two variables are what create the sense of relative deprivation. It is this sense of
deprivation that leads to protests and calls for changes, generally peacefully.
Essentially, differences in cultural identity are reified with changes in political
participation and economic access. Increases in one should be mirrored by increases in the
other. Otherwise, a sense of relative deprivation becomes apparent.
While Hancock’s (1998) argument is applied to cases of violence in Northern
Ireland, former Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka, we believe that the argument is transferable to
Belgium. There are, however, two major caveats. The first caveat is that the original cases
all involved secessionist movements. In the case of Belgium, however, we believe that the
more likely mechanism of obtaining independence is dissolution rather than secession.
Some explanation of this is provided next. The second caveat is that all three of Hancock’s
original cases involved significant levels of violence whereas the Belgian case has been
devoid of much violence. We argue that unlike the other cases, Belgium has maintained
full institutional development for both major regions and has not neglected one in favor of
the other. For this reason, there is little fear of extinction on the part of one group and
violence has not occurred for this reason. Again, some further discussion is required.
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Mechanisms of Independence: Dissolution versus Secession
Despite the multitude of discussions on the subject of secession, it is incorrect to think of
this mechanism as the only way in which a given region may become independent.
Dissolution is possible in Belgium given that the state does not have a mechanism to hold a
referendum (Kauffman and Waters 2004). Obviously, this causes significant problems for
the Flemish if they desired the ability to democratically withdraw from the Belgian state.
Dissolution, we argue, means that the center dissolves entirely creating two or more
brand new states. If we take the hypothetical example of state A, in a dissolution state A no
longer exists; rather, it is replaced by states B and C (and, if necessary, states D, E and so
on). Secession, in contrast however, is the removal of a territory on the periphery of a state.
This means that in our example, state A continues to exist after secession but is joined by
state B (and, where applicable, by states C, D and so on). State A diminishes in population,
territory size and overall GDP but nonetheless continues to function as a legitimate and
viable state.

Why Peaceful, Not Violent Dissolution?
Peace, for the most part, will prevail in the case of Belgium unlike other cases of ethnonationalism like Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Rwanda and many others. The
reason for this is that there is no real fear of extinction on the part of either linguistic
constituency.
Unlike these other cases, there is relatively little institutional underdevelopment. As
we shall see in the next section, Wallonia enjoys the same institutional benefits as Flanders
even if the region is unhappy about the increasing separatist tendencies within the region.
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Beyond this, it is difficult to imagine the heart of Europe descending into political violence
and civil war regardless of how intense linguistic disputes become. Belgium is a wealthy
state also which again reduces the likelihood of conflict.

Cultural Identity underscoring Economic Access and Political Participation
Hancock’s (1998) argument notes three important variables: cultural identity,
economic access and political participation. As mentioned earlier, the most important point
is with respect to changes. In the latter two variables, they must follow one another in equal
measure with increases and decreases. For example, if region A becomes significant
wealthy, region A also requires greater autonomy otherwise the group increasingly senses
relative deprivation. State dissolution, we argue, is more likely if this occurs.
In this section, we start by spelling out some of the main cultural differences
between Flanders and Wallonia such that Belgium has two clear linguistic communities
each with a separate sense of identity. Once this is in place, we examine economic access
and political participation. It does not matter necessarily if one group is richer than the
other so long as it is matched with a similar distribution of political power. Relative
deprivation occurs when an increase in one area is not met with an increase in another area.
It is at this point, we argue, that dissolution will likely occur.

Cultural Identity
The major difference between Flemish and Walloons, in most measures, differs on the
issue of language. Flemish is an offshoot of Dutch whereas the Walloons speak French
(Snyder 1992, 68). Furthermore, only 11 percent of the country is bilingual which
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facilitates further problems with regards to national unity (Snyder 1982, 67). Modern
Belgium is divided into three parts encompassing Flemish, Walloon and a small German
speaking population. These areas are quite homogenous in terms of language and culture
with the notable exception of the capital city. Indeed, the capital city of Brussels is in
Flemish territory but is dominated by Walloons who have government jobs or other
positions at the headquarters of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) (Lyon 1971, 128-130).
As a result of the linguistic and cultural divide in Belgium, a number of key facets
of the Belgian state are divided. This is most evident in government whereby the Flemish
and Walloons have separate lower houses (similar to the Czechoslovak case). Political
parties are also divided into linguistic blocs despite supposed uniformity in national
platforms. Ideology, once the uniting factor in Belgian politics, has faded in light of
increasing nationalism and the politics of compromise have only seemed to facilitate
national differences between the groups.
The Flemish obtained unilingual status in 1962 replete with cultural autonomy
(O’Neill 2000, 116). While linguistic liberty was enshrined in the Constitution in 1831, the
upper class in Belgium was dominated by francophone’s providing them with significant
advantages in the new society (Hooghe 1991, 11). This, perhaps, obviously was bound to
lead to problems as it stifled the ability of the Flemish to gain real access to institutional
levers in the country as well as succeed economically. A language census in 1846
identified 42.1 percent French speakers, 57 percent Dutch speakers and 0.8 percent German
speakers (Hooghe 1991, 11). Dutch being the dominant language in Belgium was also
associated with lower classes and lesser economic development in the nineteenth century.
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To protect their interests and ability to ascend the economic ladder, language laws were
important to protecting Flemish rights. Moreover, a new policy of unilingual territorialism
in 1932 brought protections for Dutch speaking workers and effectively served to keep jobs
for the Flemish (Hooghe 1991, 12).
In the case of Belgium, the linguistic and cultural divide has cemented the existence
of two different ethnie’s7 in the country. Furthermore, Flemish elites such as, Yves Leterme
and Filip Dewinter, despite their ideological differences have, in some regards, made the
current Belgian state unworkable. This case has some startling similarities with NorwaySweden and Czechoslovakia with regards to elite led problems and an existing
constitutional crisis that threatens to dissolve the state. Only time will tell as to whether the
current constitutional crisis is large enough to lead to dissolution but many of the requisite
factors are in place.
The electoral system in Belgium too has contributed to the reification of ethnic and
linguistic communities. Guy Lardeyret (1996) argues in response to Arend Lijphart (1994)
that the parliamentary-proportional representation system in place in Belgium has indeed
reified the differences between the Flemings and Walloons such that the monarchy is the
only cement that has retained national unity (Lardeyret 1996, 177).
With regards to other cultural factors like religion, it has long been asserted that the
Flemish north was more religious than its Wallonian neighbors to the south (Billiet,
Maddens and Frognier 2006, 913). Nonetheless, the decline in Flemish religiosity has
declined to the point of parity so religious differences can no longer really be asserted as a
reason for difference.

7

The term “ethnie” is Anthony D. Smith’s (1991) basically describing a nation with shared ethnic, religious
and linguistic traditions.
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The three communities are drifting further apart even with regards to their media
sources. The Flemish have VRT, the Walloons have the aforementioned RTBF and the
German community has BRF (Billiet, Maddens and Frognier 2006, 914). As the media
remains divided, identity remains divided because what people see, hear and discuss on a
daily basis will be different in each community. The glue, so to speak, of society is eroding
in this way.
Another cultural factor is intermarriage between different groups. Intermarriage
between people in Flanders and Wallonia is quite low with less than 8 percent in Flanders
and less than 20 percent in Wallonia (Billiet, Maddens and Frognier 2006, 915). This is
perhaps the best evidence of cultural separation between the Flemish and Walloon
populations.
Given the evident cultural separation between the two populations, not to mention
the small German minority in the east, Belgium falls under the criteria established by
Hancock (1998) such that it deserves further scrutiny under the lens of political
participation and economic access.

Economic Access
Modern Belgium is a strong example of a market economy with a strong export base
(Stallaerts 2007, xxx). Traditionally, the French speaking bourgeoisie dominated the
economic make up across Belgium (Hooghe 1991, 11). This was problematic in many
senses because even in Dutch dominated areas, the French bourgeoisie were in positions of
power. Over time, however, the economic dominance of the French eroded such that gross
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national product as of 2003 was distributed in this way: 57.2 percent in Flanders, 23.4
percent in Wallonia and 18.2 percent in Brussels (Stallaearts 2007, xxx).
Liesbet Hooghe argues that economic factors examining the desire for separatism
and the business cycle fall flat (Hooghe 2004, 81). However, economic concerns are
important in the Flemish-Walloon divide given the significant disparity between the
economic engine in Flanders. This might not be so bad if it were not for transfer payments
to the Wallonian south which many Flemish consider a drain on the north and its
prosperity.
Since the French were historically tied to the upper and upper-middle classes, but
since this has reversed the Flemish desire more for their economic clout. As in Hancock’s
(1998) model, increased economic clout coincides with increased desires for political
control which helps to explain why the Flemish has increasingly pushed for greater
political autonomy.

Political Participation
The Flemish movement, in some ways, began as early as 1830 upon Belgian independence
as a reaction to the “Frenchification” of the state in order to protect Dutch linguistic and
cultural rights (De Witte and Klandermans 2000, 702). The francophone superiority in the
state was an obvious point of animosity but it was not expected to dominate the discourse
of the state or affect it so dramatically over 150 years later.
In political terms, Belgium historically, was a unitary state that existed despite some
trouble between the two major linguistic groups. There were few indicators that suggested
the Belgian state would be shaped by the Flemish-Walloon conflict (Hooghe 2004, 55).
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However, as Liesbet Hooghe argues, the center has gradually been hollowed in return for
peace (Hooghe 2004, 77-86).
Belgium underwent numerous constitutional changes starting in 1970 to “hollow
the center” and to allow for greater autonomy on the part of the different linguistic
communities (Hooghe 2004). Constitutional reforms took place in 1970 (Swenden and Jans
2006, 877), 1980 and 1988 (Stallaerts 2007, xix-xx). Provinces existed from 1831 to 1970
but autonomy for the various language communities better quelled Flemish dissent at their
lack of autonomy (Swenden and Jans 2006, 880). These reforms were significant because
they changed Belgium from a unitary state to a federal state (Hooghe 1995, 135).
Federalism is much more connected with state breakups in general than are unitary states.
Federal arrangements are tighter than other forms of power sharing. They are
tighter than consociations because power is focused amongst electoral winners at the
center; and tighter than confederations because the center has stronger powers than the
regions. Federations represent dual institutions in the state at the national and regional
levels with national powers taking precedence (McGarry and O’Leary 2005, 263). Power is
divided amongst these two levels of government by some form of agreement and the state
functions largely through compromise between these levels. Federal states, however, also
have direct powers over the whole state whereas confederal arrangements do not.
Federalism is often used in large countries with vast expanses of territory or people
whereby, so the logic goes, more local decision making is deemed to be necessary.8 This is
where the move to federalism is interesting because Belgium is not a big country. It does,

8

The United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Russia, India, Nigeria, Sudan, Germany, Australia
and Pakistan among others are all examples of large countries, either in terms of land mass, population or
both, that have federal governments.
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however, have different groups of people who are geographically concentrated such that
power sharing may actually help the state.
Federalism therefore has led to a level of ‘de-Belgification’ whereby political actors
and decision makers talk more about policy at the regional and community levels (Hooghe
1995, 138). This led to full legislative powers for Flanders and Wallonia in 1980; although
the Brussels region did not receive similar rights until 1988/89 (Swenden and Jans 2006,
881). Slowly the center has become increasingly weaker and terms like confederation and
consociation are used to describe Belgium even though neither really holds at least in a
strict definitional sense.9
Politically, Belgium is becoming quite divided which has, in small measure, led to
other problems for the wider society. The rise of the Vlaams Blok in 1991 restricted
identity around the Flemish ethnie and was openly separatist but also racist in ideology (De
Witte and Klandermans 2000). While the Vlaams Blok has been banned, it has come back
in other forms such as the Vlaams Belang.
What can be gleaned from Hancock (1998), therefore, is that economic access and
political participation have changed in step with one another, thus preserving a united
Belgian state. However, as evidenced by increased support for Flemish nationalists (both
moderate and extreme), the divisions in the country continue to grow. If this continues to
happen, then there are limits to the commensurate compromise that has been found for
increased political autonomy as the economic gulf widens.

9

In a confederation, the regions should be more powerful than the center which is not yet true. A
consociation, furthermore, is supposed to have specific positions for various groups within the state and the
official Head of State is supposed to be neutral whereas the case of Belgium has a decidedly French
monarchical family.

18

Process of Dissolution
Belgium is not constitutionally able to hold a referendum (Kaufmann and Waters 2004,
36). This makes the possibility of state dissolution all the more plausible because if
independence is an option, dissolution is seemingly the way to proceed unless the Walloons
accept a unilateral secession from the Flemish regional parliament. The Czechoslovaks did
have the constitutional power to hold a referendum but did not and thus dissolved into two
states without national plebiscite (Leff 1997).
Even though, at present, most Belgians prefer a united state, the same could be said
for most in Czechoslovakia by the polling in 1992 (Leff 1997). State dissolution is not an
easy process to predict but there is evidence to suggest that Belgium may well be on the
road to breakup. There is always a danger in academic circles of predicting that something
will occur but the signs of a breakup are becoming worthy of discussion.
However, as hinted above, there are numerous parallels with the case of
Czechoslovakia. There are two distinct linguistic communities, Flemish and Walloon
(Dutch and French). They occupy two separate pieces of the territory with very little
migration from one to the other with very little intermarriage and bilingualism.
Furthermore, the structure of Belgian and Czechoslovak political institutions are
becoming increasingly similar. The Czechoslovaks had a bi-federative parliament which
basically provided a unified upper chamber with two equal but separate lower chambers
divided between Czech and Slovak persons. Seats in the upper chamber were based on
population (99 Czech and 51 Slovak) whereas the lower chamber provided 75 seats for
both lower houses. Beyond the center, each community had their own regional parliaments
in Prague and Bratislava.
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Belgium, somewhat similarly has what is described as a bipartite parliament. There
is a Senate and a Chamber of Representatives. Like Czechoslovakia also, there are regional
parliaments beyond this. Even though the Chamber of Representatives has significant
linguistic divisions, all members sit in the same parliament unlike Czechoslovakia.10 This is
a small difference but a significant one given the ability of thirty Slovak deputies to veto all
Czechoslovak legislation.
Beyond this there are two other major differences between the Czechoslovak case
and Belgium. Brussels is the capital of Europe and a major factor in the success of the
Belgian economy. It has a great number of francophone’s in the city who would not easily
be persuaded to be part of an independent Flanders. Second, democracy has been present in
Belgium for much longer than it had been in Czechoslovakia given the short amount of
time between the 1989 Velvet Revolution and the 1993 Velvet Divorce.
Despite these differences, there is now a real point of comparison with other
dissolved unions like Czechoslovakia. In some senses, the various linguistic communities
are evidently drifting apart in ways that are comparable to other cases. The center has
become gradually weaker to the point that the Belgian state is now described as a
consociation and a confederation. As noted earlier, we do not fully accept these labels, but
their use suggests that Belgium is at least closer to them. We also assert that Belgium is
closer to dissolution than other states due to institutional factors.
What differentiates the Flemish separatist movements from other prominent
peaceful movements like Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland is the institutional structure of
the state. The set-up of the state and its legislative functions makes Belgium more
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Even here there are striking similarities with Czechoslovakia such that both linguistic groups have to
successful vote for each piece of legislation.
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susceptible to dissolution than other states like Canada, Spain or the United Kingdom. Each
of these states faces the possible threat of secession from the periphery; most notably in the
case of Quebec where two referenda’s have already been held on ‘sovereignty.’ The
relative power, however, of Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia within each of their states is
not extensive. For instance, Quebec has 75 MPs in the 308 member Canadian House of
Commons. If the Bloc Quebecois were somehow able to win all 75 seats in Quebec, they
could still not deadlock Canadian parliament. The same logic holds rue for Scotland and
Catalonia. Flemish nationalists, however, do have the ability to deadlock parliament as we
saw at the outset of this paper. On a few occasions this has happened such that Belgium
does not have a functioning legislative branch for months at a time. The only question is
when does this become a tipping point for the dissolution of the state into two separate
pieces, one Flemish and one Walloon?
The process of dissolution, however, is not as simple as a guaranteed breakup once
one part of the state wants out and deadlocks parliament. This has happened before in
Czechoslovakia and, to some extent, Norway-Sweden and Serbia and Montenegro. What is
required is both units of the state to agree to the terms. For example, the Czechs finally
called the Slovak bluff (Kraus and Stranger 2000; Leff 1997; Musil 1995; Svec 1992),
Sweden accepted Norway’s incessant calls for independence from 1884 through 1905
(Derry 1973, 136) and Serbia came to terms with the Montenegrin referendum results and
the will of the international community (Darmanovic 2007; Roberts 2007).
What is required then is the acceptance albeit reluctant acceptance by both sides.
Even if the Flemish are set on independence, it will have difficulty passing without some
Walloon support. In states like Belgium that does not have referenda procedures, Wallonia
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is a key factor in the future of the Belgian state. Even if Belgium did allow for a
referendum, much is still required. There is setting the date, setting the question, the
campaign, rallies, sober second thought and then a vote. If we compare two cases briefly,
Montenegro and Quebec, this difference between independence and the status quo can be
marginal. The May 2006 Montenegrin referendum was given a 55 percent threshold by the
European Union (EU) in the hopes that violence would not return to the former
Yugoslavia. As a result, the Montenegrin ‘yes’ campaign had more work to do in order to
reach this threshold. When the results came in, 55.5 percent of Montenegrins had voted to
support independence. Independence was declared by both Montenegro and Serbia
respectively which brought an end to their union. Quebec, in contrast, held their second
referendum on independence in October 1995. After a tight fought campaign and the rise of
Lucien Bouchard, Quebec came precariously close to obtaining the magic 50 percent
threshold. The vote, when fully counted, came to 49.5 percent.
What these examples illustrate is that in a democracy, the future of a country can be
decided by less than fifty thousand votes as occurred in both Montenegro and Quebec. It is
far from obvious that a 50 percent majority of Flemish want outright independence so, even
if they could hold a referendum, the results are not clear.
All this does is continue to illustrate the point that the dissolution must be at least
tacitly mutual such that Wallonia accepts independence and moves on from there. Within
the EU, this should not be a problem but state breakups obviously leave deep emotional
wounds on the psyche of the state.
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Conclusion
We conclude, based on the theory and process outlined in this paper, that Belgium is not
yet at a point of dissolution. It is, however, becoming likelier with political participation
since some prominent leaders and parties favor separatism. If the variables of economic
access and political participation do not continue to move commensurately then dissolution
will likely occur.
Moreover, the process of dissolution is certainly possible in Belgium given the
comparison to other cases which exemplify how dissolution has occurred in other cases.
Yet, however, the process is not as easy as it may seem. Belgium, thus far, has provided an
increase in economic access with increases in political participation so as to satisfy the
different cultural communities. In this way, Belgian federalism has pacified the full
demands for independence. Having said this, however, there are limits to how much
autonomy can be granted before the state basically ceases to function as a unified polity.
Belgium is not there yet but by the mere fact that it can be described as a confederation is
alarming; the regions have at least equal amounts, if not more power than the center.
Another consideration is the transfer payments made from richer Flanders to poorer
Wallonia. If the gap between the two regions continues to widen, further problems may
develop as money is transferred from one part of the country to another. Relative
deprivation increases without a parallel increase in political participation and since there is
little more autonomy to give, dissolution may increasingly become a viable option.
Naturally, a sense of relative deprivation declines if the Walloons were to narrow
the economic gap between the two communities. This, however, is unlikely in the modern
economic climate but it could possibly change with shifts in the global economy towards
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different sectors. It could also decline if transfer payments were significantly reduced but
this, in many ways, would decrease the value of the state since it would apportion resources
like two separate countries. What we mean by this is that if transfer payments are
decreased, Flemish health care and education become vastly superior to Wallonian health
care and education because of funding. It is at this point that the two communities become
de facto independent states even if they remain together in name. Dissolution will merely
be a parliamentary act waiting to happen.
Finally, the comparisons between Czechoslovakia and Belgium are very interesting.
Not only is the structure of parliament very similar but Belgium does not have the ability to
hold a referendum (Kauffman and Waters 2004, 36). Czechoslovakia dissolved through an
Act of Parliament even with the constitutional ability to stage a referendum. Some will
argue that this is undemocratic; however, it was democratically elected officials that cast
their votes for dissolution. These lessons are important for the future of Belgium and it is
certainly quite possible that Belgium could follow the example of dissolution in other cases
unless the theoretical warnings are heeded.
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